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INTRODUCTION
Petroleum - truly the life "blood of our Armed
Forces. Never before in our National Defense has a
sinsrle commodity been so vital both to the conduct of
military operations and to the industrial economy that
must support it.
History has shown that the decree of success of
a military operation is in direct proportion to the
adequacy of its petroleum supply. Significant in
this regard was the confession of the German military
strategist, General Ludendorff, who in his memoirs
stated, "it was chiefly because of insufficient oil
reserves in World War I that Germany was forced to
sue for peace in November, 1918." Additionally,
Winston Churchill remarked, "The allies had literally
floated on a sea of oil to victory in World War II;"
and finally, the importance of petroleum in modern
war and the effect of petroleum supply on strategy
is well illustrated In the testimony of Admiral Tocoda
(Chief, Naval Combined Forces, Japan) to the effect
that "Japanese loss of tankers and oil resources
precluded further large scale Naval operations against
the United States in 1945 ."
The challenging speed, dispersion, and mobility
of present day military tactics hinge almost exclusively
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on use of petroleum consuming machines. Even the
advent of fissionable energy sources and formidable
global ballistic missiles in the military arena has
not stemmed the ever-growiner demands for petroleum.
Military planned procurement in 1965 is expected to
increase approximately 15,000,000 barrels over the
requirements for Fiscal Year 1961. During 1961,
deliveries were at a peace time high of 722,000
barrels per day as compared with peak mobilization
consumption during World War II of 1,500,000 barrels
2per day.
Impressive as these facts appear, of greater
significance is the staegerincr petroleum requirements
in the event of another war. Captain J. M. Boyd, USN,
speaking before the Canada-United States, Permanent
Joint Board on Defense in August, 1948, estimated,
"All of the probable military requirements for
petroleum products when added together will be in
the vicinity of 9 to 10 million barrels per day"^ —
1Clyde La Motte, "Military Fuel Demand is
Going Up Again," The Oil and Gas Journal . October 30,1961
John H. Morse, J., Captain, USN, "Petroleum,"
Naval War College Review, Vol. V, No. 7, March, 1953.
3Bureau of Naval Personnel, Petroleum Logistics ,
NAVPERS 10892, Department of the New, 1955, pTTT"
.
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at an annual military expenditure rate of 6 billion
dollars a year.
From this sobering discussion emerges the fact
that the limiting factor in the development of our
military defense system is economics — economics
which deals with the allocation of scarce resources.
We must seek to improve our national defense by the
means of increasing the effectiveness of this alloca-
tion process.
The approach of this paper is to give broad
coverage to the many aspects of military petroleum
logistics, Navy oriented. Included are the milestones
and concepts that form the evolution of the petroleum
logistic system, -the petroleum organizations and their
related functions, and finally an analysis of the
existing petroleum logistic system itself.
The vital importance of oil as the life blood
of our fighting forces, the resource constraints, and
the impact of the tremendous military expenditure of
funds for petroleum on our national economy dictate the
most economical, militarily responsive, petroleum
logistic system possible - does our existing system
meet these criterion?
As a point of reference, the existing system is
considered to include the period up through 30 December
1961 encompassing the Military Petroleum Supply Agency,




EVOLUTION OF THE PETROLEUM LOGISTIC SYSTEM
Early 1900 development
s
At the turn of the century the United States Navy
was excited about the experimentation of oil burning
equipment for ship propulsion. Perhaps the greatest
hindrance to the assured development of such equipment
and eventual installation in all Naval ships was the
UNCERTAINTY of the source of fuel oil supply. The oil
industry was in its infancy and not much was known
about how much oil the United States could produce
and for how long. Even if plenty of oil were available
another larcre problem loomed on the horizon — the
problem of distribution as oil could not be obtained
for naval ships in all ports of call.
The results of oil-fired propulsion were so
enthusiastically received that the Secretary of the
Navy in 1914 announced in his annual report for 1914,
"In the future, all fight inc ships built for the Navy
would burn oil solely." As time passed, more and more
ships were built, or converted, to turn oil; and the
question of continued supply was raised more and more
frequently. Finally, the Englneer-in-Chief of the
Navy in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated
15 April 1916 stated:

The question of the supply of fuel
oil for the fleet is of such great importance
that the Bureau "believes that it should be
taken up and seriously studied at once in order
that the necessary information may be had as to
the cheapest fuel oil that may be used, the
quantity and location of storage that should
be provided, the methods that should be
adopted for providing the current supply, and
the plans that should be formulated and followed
in order that the Navy may be assured of an
adequate future supply and in order that the
Navy Department may intelligently and safely
continue its policy of building oil-burning
vessels
.
On the matter of future oil availability,
the same letter indicated:
The Department of the Interior
estimates that there remains in the oil fields
of the nation a supply for only twenty-five
years, and a recognized authority on this subject
states:
In the exhaustion of its oil lands and with
no assured sourde of domestic supply in sight,
the United States is confronted with a
national crisis of the first magnitude —
-
we must either plan for the future or we
must pass into a condition of commercial
vassalage, in time of peace relying on some
foreign country for the petroleum where-with
to lubricate the highways of commerce, in
time of war at the mercy of the enemy who
may either control the source of supply or
the means of transportation .1
This letter had immediate effect- The establish-
ment of Naval Petroleum Reserves and government with-
drawal, from public entry and settlement, of certain
Hamilton, J. E., Lieutenant, USN, HA Short History
of the Naval Use of Fuel Oil,'1 Journal of the American
Society of Naval Engineers , August, 1933.

3large land areas In known oil producing areas in
California and Wyoming reasonably assured the Navy
of its continued oil supply. To solve the problem of
distribution the Navy shortly thereafter began construc-
tion of storage tanks, tankers, barges and terminal
facilities, strategically located to serve the needs
of the fleet.
Thus from the beginning of the oil era in the
Navy, the Navy had been beset with problems of oil
supply, and had the attendant distribution problems
associated therewith.
World War 1 to 1941
During World War I sufficient oil was obtained
and distributed to meet the needs of the fleet.
However, at this time, mechanized warfare and military
aircraft took on new importance with resultant large
demands for petroleum fuels. This began the independ-
ent, non-related procurement competition by the Services
to obtain their requirements of petroleum. The
Services established and maintained their own separate
petroleum logistic systems including purchase responsi-
bility, distribution, and bulk terminal operation. In
the years to follow, mounting United States oil reserves
and industry refinery capability were such that
neither the government nor the Armed Forces were much
.
4concerned for their petroleum supply. The Navy had
expanded its strategically located terminals and
developed a vast network of bulk terminal facilities
worldwide and fueling at sea had met with considerable
success
.
With the situation as favorable as it was it is
no wonder that the Armed Forces approached World War II
with a certain amount of complacency with regard to
procurement and distribution of petroleum.
Military coordinated efforts after 1941
Petroleum, being so vital to the military and
civilian needs, has experienced extensive coordinating
efforts since 1941. With the outbreak of World War II
this indispensable commodity was singled out for
coordinated control. Petroleum has since been among
the forerunners in such amalgamated efforts of coordina-
ted purchasing, ^oint purchasing, sinerle service
procurement and support situations of cross servicing,
common servicing, and Joint servicing.
A synopsis of the coordinated efforts after 1941
is as followss
Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense —
Early in 1941 the Secretary of Interior was appointed the
Petroleum Coordinator for National Defense with respon-
sibility to "make petroleum available adequately and

continuously, in the proper forms, at the proper
places to meet military and civilian needs."
Army-Navy Petroleum Board -- Services
continued to purchase their own requirements until
1942. During the period 1941-42 the Services beoran
to feel the pinch of procurement competition caused
by increased military requirements, thus bringing
about the need for coordination. The Army-Navy
Petroleum Board (ANPB) was formed to consolidate
requirements for purchasing with different Services
assigned the purchasing responsibility for different
products for all military requirements (coordinated
purchasing). It is mentioned that ANPB itself was
not a procurement agency as such, although its mission
included the coordination of petroleum procurement as
well as coordination of other petroleum matters such
as overseas shipment and storage.
Joint Army-Navy Petroleum Purchasing Agency -
The "Draper-Strauss" Report recommended that "Although
the then War and Navy Departments were functioning
adequately under the methods of coordinated procure-
ment of single service purchase assignment, a ^oint
central purchasing agency should be established
because a centrally located direct line agency would
provide further general advantages of simplicity,
-
6expedited action and reduction of administrative
overhead and personnel in contrast to duplicate
functional agencies under different commands at
different places." As a result of the Draper-Strauss
Report, the Joint Army-Navy Petroleum Purchasing
Agency (JANPPA) was established in 194-5. With the
establishment of the JANPPA, Joint purchasing of
petroleum products was accomplished by grouping
petroleum purchasing sections of the Services into
a single geographical location. Although this did
not actually put a central procurement system into
effect, a method of cross procurement was actually
developed between the Services. This resulted in
considerable savings, both in Government funds and
time. The overall efficiency of this procedure was,
however, limited by the extensive interservice
transfer required between the procuring and consuming
Services. JANPPA, as well as the ANPB, existed until
the National Security Act of 1947 was passed, which
eliminated the ANPB.
Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency -
The Armed Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency (ASPPA)
was created to overcome the deficiency of the JANPPA.
In 1948, JANPPA became the Armed Services Petroleum
Purchasing Agency with a Charter under the National
Security Act of 19^7 to procure Petroleum for all the
Services. ASPPA then became a full-fledged joint

purchasing organization entailing a central procure-
ment system on a Joint Service basis for purchasing
all military requirements (Joint Purchasing).
In addition to performing the functions of a
purchasing agency, the ASPPA inherited the responsi-
bilities formerly performed by the JANPPA. These
did not include the significant inventory control
tasks or the control of the distribution system which




Military Petroleum SuppIv Agency - In 1956
the Military Petroleum Supply Agency (MPSA) was formed
as one of the four orieinal Single Manager Operating
Agencies. MPSA was activated on 7 January 1957 as a
means of improving the effectiveness and economy of
petroleum supply and service operations throughout
the Defense Establishment. ASPPA was then dissolved
with MPSA assuming that agency's functions. The
principal new responsibilities assigned to MPSA were tos
1. coordinate the petroleum distribution
systems for the Department of Defense.
2. coordinate the positioning of mobiliza-
tion reserves and operating stocks.
3. coordinate and promulgate Interservice
supply support agreements.
4. coordinate the program for dispersion
and protection of contract commercial
storage facilities.
5. procure all the requirements for
commercial petroleum services.

6. direct the procurement Inspection
program.
7. coordinate the cataloging activities
of the military services.
8. coordinate the program of standard-
ization.
The organization structure showing these functions
is shown on Chart 1, page 9 • Although MPSA conformed
to the concept of a Single Manager Operating Agency,
several significant variations appear in the Charter
which stated:
The scope of this assignment is limited to
the extent that neither ownership nor funding
by a single stock fund is provided for the
management of petroleum and petroleum products.
This deviation is justified by the character-
istics of petroleum and the exceptional
conditions encountered in the supply and
distribution of this commodity by the military
departments .3
Consequently, MPSA did not have responsibility for
the computation of net requirements and did not
exercise stock ownership. These functions, together
with inventory control, remained the responsibility
of the various Services.
Throughout the history of fuel procurement, the
various procurement organizations operated in some-
what a different environment than other commodity
Military Petroleum Supply Agency pamphlet,
Military Petroleum Supply « Department of the Navy, n.d
^Department of Defense Directive 5160.18, ASD
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groups in the supply field. They continually were
required to work with groups in other Executive
Departments concerned with petroleum because of its
vital nature, large requirements for Defense, and
the Impracticability and inability to store large
reserves
.
In advancing through the stages of independent,
non-related, competitive procurement, single depart-
ment purchasing assignment and joint purchasing, the
military petroleum procurement system finally reached
the Single Manager (Modified) plateau. These advances
have not been without fanfare at each incremental
rise. Just as now, the Service cries have been
that the Commander must control his logistic system
to insure resoonsiveness to command - authority
communsurate with responsibility for the mission
was and is the mainstay. The battle for authority
has been bitter; integration progress incomplete.
MPSA can be considered as an organization established
historically by logical necessity, with valid basis,
but with controlled growth evolution. With its
modified Single Manager Charter, MPSA represented a
compromise solution by the three Services to the




ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVING PETROLEUM LOGISTICS
AND THEIR FUNCTIONS
General
The essentiality of Petroleum to our National
Defense efforts during peace and war, for both
military and civilian economy, requires the closest
attention and coordination at all levels of government
Vastly fluctuating demands during emergencies, with
limited resources available suggests that positive,
yet flexible, control system must be intact to provide
sensible, equitable distribution to fill priority
needs of the military, industry and civilian economy.
In order to insure an integrated approach to the
distribution of petroleum resources, many agencies
are closely interwoven to this end with the Secretary
of Interior being the focal point for the numerous
petroleum matters of concern to the government. As
a matter of reference, Chart 2, pape 12, depicts the
principal agencies concerned directly with petroleum.
Generally speaking, the Office of Oil and Gas, within
the Department of the Interior, concerns itself with
coordination and unification of oil and gas policies
of all Federal agencies and enlists their cooperation
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utilization of petroleum resources and facilities
to meet civilian, industrial, and military require-
ments in time of peace or national emergency.
Other agencies and their principal functions are:
the Department of State which is involved in the
international aspects and developments of petroleum
abroad; the Department of Defense concerns itself
with matters pertaininsr to defense from a supply
point of view and in terms of maintaining a "broad
economic base for defense mobilization; and finally,
the General Services Administration purchases the
petroleum products for the agencies of the United
States Government other than defense requirements.
Chart 3, page 14, portrays the Department of
Defense petroleum organization and in the discussion
of military elements below only the responsibilities
of these organization units pertaining to petroleum
logistics are shown.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Logistics) ASD(I&L) is responsible for advising
and assisting the Secretary of Defense in the establish-
ment of effective policies and systems for the
efficient and economical operation of the DCD in the
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distribution, transportation, storage, cataloging,
requirements and mobilization planning.
The Defense Reorganization Act of 195$ strength-
ened the position of SEGDEF, in turn ASD (I&L) by
granting specific authority to organize and operate
common supply services without beinc subject to
compromise or veto by the Services.^ This authority,
as will be shown later, eventually served to pave the
way for consolidation of common petroleum supply under
BOD sponsorship. The authority Itself stems from
changes made in the preamble to the National Security
Act of 1947 which stated, "To provide three military
departments separately administered," to read, "To
provide a Department of Defense, including three
11
military departments, and further provided that
these were to be "separately organized" rather than
"separately administered."
Importantly, the Petroleum Logistics Policy
Directorate of Assistant Secretary of Defense (I&L)
is the DOD's key unit for petroleum policy and it
happens to be the sole purely commodity organization
within the Office of Secretary of Defense. This
TJnited States Congress, Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Aspects of Military Procurement and Supply .
Report of the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement,
86d Congress, 2d Session, October, I960 (Washington?
Government Printinor Office, I960), p. 110.
.
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Division, based on JCS Strategic and Logistic Plans,
forward planning assumptions and guidance to the
Military Petroleum Advisory Board in the Department
of Interior, which board is involved in determining
the capability of industry to support war plans. In
turn, the Petroleum Logistics Policy Directorate of
OSD evaluates the Military Petroleum Advisory Board
comments on support capability to determine if
Strategic plans can be supported lopistically
.
Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization
The function of the JCS organization is basically
to provide for formulation of military strategy and
joint logistic plans and assignment of logistic
responsibilities to the military departments in
support of such plans.
Office of Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves
The mission of the office of Naval Petroleum
and Oil Shale Reserves is to explore, prospect,
conserve, develop, use, operate and administer the
Naval Petroleum Reserves; administer the Naval Oil
Shale Reserves; and serve as the principal Department
of the Navy Advisory Office on matters relating to
crude petroleum, both domestic and foreign. The
Army and Air Force have no true counterpart of this




Chief of Naval Operations
The Chief of Naval Operations is responsible for
the logistic support of the Operating Forces of the
Navy and such Navy component forces of Unified, or
Specified Commands, as may be assigned by higher
authority. Within the CNC organization, the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, Logistic Plans Division,
has the responsibility for the following specific
functions relating to petroleum:
1. establishing world-wide levels of supply
and mobilization reserve stocks of
principal bulk products.
2. establishing the optimum quantities for
storage at specific locations.
3. promulgating consumption factors.
4. coordinating the preparation and determina-
tion of requirements in terms of product
and storage space necessary to support
current and future plans.
5. preparing broad Navy policies and plans
insofar as they affect the logistic support
of the Naval Establishment.
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts is responsible
for the procurement, funding, storage and issue of all
.
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petroleum products required by the Navy. This
function has teen assigned to the Fuel Supply Office
(FSO), which, acting as the designated Navy Inventory
Control Point serves to assure the proper balance
between the supply of and demand for items under its
control. This mission of FSC relates to the three
major logistic steps ofs
1. computes net requirements for each product
and determines when, and where needed.
2. procures requirements through MPSA.
Although MPSA negotiates the contracts,
the FSO places orders with MPSA.
3. directs distribution of items purchased
by MPSA for the Navy (packaged only).
In exercising inventory control, FSO establishes
minimum and maximum stock levels of supply for the
various items; interprets and processes stock status
reports; analyzes operating data to effect replenish-
ment of bulk and packaged stocks within continental
United States; and also determines and initiates
disposal action for excess stocks.
Navy bulk fuel terminal facilities throughout
the world are financed by BuS&A and are under its
management and technical control, this control being
exercised by the Fuel Supply Office. This office

19
recommends to the Assistant Chief of the Bureau for
Supply Management the fuel-facility requirements for
use in current, mobilization, and logistic code
planning, based on directives from the Ghief of Naval
Operations. Requirements include data on locations,
products to be stored, timing and relative priority
of alterations, justification of new projects for
construction, leasing, amount of additional storage
required and the type of storage needed. The pattern
of the responsibilities for the petroleum inventory
control points of all three military departments are
somewhat a mirror reflection of FSC's responsibility.
Military Sea Transportation Service - Prior to 1949
the Navy operated and maintained its own independent
transportation service at sea. The Army did likewise
to meet its own requirements and also those of the
Air Force. With the advent of the Single Manager
for Ocean Transportation in August 1949, the Military
Sea Transportation Service (MSTS) has since been
responsible for the sea transportation of bulk
petroleum for the entire Department of Defense. The
transportation function of MSTS is considered to be
an integral part of the overall logistic operation
within the Navy and is designed to be responsive to
logistic support requirements. The extent of tanker
movement costs for fiscal year 1955 was approximately
.
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,000,000 to lift $417,000,000 of bulk petroleum
products. MSTS accomplishes this delivery through:
1. a nucleus fleet of Navy owned, Navy
manned oilers and Navy owned tankers which
are contract manned and operated.
2. industry furnished tankers through the
Voluntary Tanker Plan. This plan was
developed to meet emergency situations
by industry to preclude the necessity
of Government siezure of tankers in a
market of ever diminishing availability
during crises periods.
Joint Petroleum Office - During World War II over
60 per cent of the total material shipped overseas
was comprised of petroleum products. 5 This volume
was so great within the various theaters that the
then Army-Navy Petroleum Board found it essential
to have some system of coordinating these requirements,
delivery thereof, and facilities for handling. As a
result, Area Petroleum Offices - later designated
as Joint Petroleum Offices (JPO) - were established
on the staff of each theater commander for the staff
supervision of all petroleum matters within the
ffeographical command area."




The functional JPO organization has "been so
effective that it still exists today. The JPO serves
as the focal point for theater petroleum logistics.
Typical functions include:
1. coordinating logistic policy and planning
in conjunction with MPSA and the Military
Departments concerned.
2. consolidating theater peacetime require-
ments and formulation of replenishment
program and distribution system consistent
with those requirements.
3. coordinating the quality surveillance
program within the unified command.
4. allocations programming under emergency
conditions
.
5« monitoring the prescribed service levels
of major items to insure adequacy of stocks.
JPO's are jointly staffed by Military personnel
on an equal basis from each military service having
a mission in the area. These personnel are integrated
within JPO without regard to the service they represent.
Sub Area Petroleum Offices - The last petroleum
logistic organization to be mentioned is the overseas
Sub Area Petroleum Office (SAPC) which functions as
an extension of the JPO organization at a lower
.
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operational level within the Unified Command. SAPO'
s
have one important distinction, however, and that is
they are directly involved with the day to day petroleum
operations at the end of the pipe line.
Generally, the Sub Area Petroleum Office compiles
requirements for both bulk and packaged products for all
three Services for submission to the area JPO and
furnishes guidance on the disposition of excesses or
on meeting shortages generated by the various Services
at the working level.
.
CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF THE PETROLEUM LOGISTIC SYSTEM
Single Manager Plan
The culmination of the petroleum coordinated
efforts of the military after 1941 resulted in
adoption of the Single Manager Plan for Petroleum.
The primary objectives of the plan were said to be
to:
1. eliminate duplication and overlapping
of effort between and among the military
departments
.
2. improve the effectiveness and economy
of supply and service operations through-
out the Department of Defense.
These objectives, of course, were now new; they
are reflections of the goals of single service
procurement, joint purchasing assignment and coordina-
ted procurement programs. Perhaps the most strikingly,
distinctive feature of the Single Manager Plan was to
vest in a single Military Department, responsibility
for procurement, stock maintenance, and distribution
of a selected commodity for all military users.
^Department of Defense Directive 5160.12.
Policies for Implementation of Single Manager Assign-
ments, January 31, 1956.
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The proposed BOD charter for Petroleum Single
Manager provided that all Service wholesale stocks
of petroleum would be capitalized, and that the
Single Manager would then perform all procurement,
manage inventory stocks, and sell through the usual
stock funding arrangements to the retail level of
Service users. A three-way split in Service
recommendations to the proposed charter developed,
as follows?
The Air Force opposed any change in stock
ownership, basing its argument on the necessity
of maintaining continuous control of its
Mobilization Reserves; the Army proposed to
limit agency stock ownership to the continental
United States; the Navy proposed that the agency's
stock ownership extend to certain overseas
stocks .2
As indicated elsewhere in this study this wide
divergence of opinion served to modify the Petroleum
Single Manager Charter to exclude stock ownership and
distribution. Because of the compromise of the Single
Manager concept in the creation of MPSA and its
inability to handle many distribution problems with
limited authority, recent findings of the Logistics
Systems Study Project Team (LSSP) commented, "there was
in fact no Single Manager for Petroleum in the Department
of Defense. "3 This statement is amplified by the two
2U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee
on Government Operations. Military Supply Management
.
Hearings before Subcommittee, 86d Congress, First Sess.
May 25 and 26, 1959, (Washington: Government Printing
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charts 4. and 5», pastes 26 and 27, which show graph-
ically the difference "between the intended Single
Manager Plan and the actual limited extent of MPSA's
operation.
Further findings on the shortcomings in petrol-
eum supply operations as presented in a report by the
LSSP team in December 1957 revealed
s
overstocking; duplication of stocks at one or
more sources; procurement of items already in
lone supply; duplication of facilities and
procurement of items held by another Service
as excess.
These deficiencies, too, can be attributed to
the separate uncoordinated, Service inventory control
and distribution systems.
Logistic Processes
Necessary to an evaluation of the existing
petroleum logistic system stated in the Introduction,
is an identification and discussion of the three
major steps of the logistic processes, namely:
1. determination of requirements,
2. procurement,
3. distribution.
Only those factors within each of these main
broad steps considered germain to this paper will
be presented.
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It has "been pointed out that the Charter for MPSA
specifically excluded computation of net requirements
from its responsibility. This perogative and responsi-
bility rests with the individual Service and is one
which is jealously controlled by them. The Services
point to the military commander's traditional insistence
that he control his own vital logistics in order to
retain authority commensurate with the responsibility
for carrying out assigned missions. Consequently, the
Chief of Naval Operations, based on approved JCS
Strategic and Logistic Plans, establishes Navy world-
wide, peacetime and Mobilization Reserve Material Stock
Levels of petroleum products. Usincr these stock level
guide lines, the Fuel Supply Office determines the net
requirements for bulk and packaged items within the
continental United States. Likewise, the Navy overseas
stocking activities also assume the responsibility for
maintaining these levels subject to review by the FSO
to determine compliance with CNO levels and to determine
availability of funds for procurement. No regular
review of requirements is made at the DOD level. MPSA
lacks authority to review service requirements for




The determination of requirements, I.e., what is
needed, where it is to be positioned and when, forms
the basis for all procurement action. Procurement is
based on the determination of requirements and like
that step in the process of logistics is largely
dependent upon the present, or future, availability
of crude petroleum, finished petroleum products,
facilities, man power, need for services, and operating
requirements. Petroleum products and petroleum services
procurement is big business. It commands the position
of being the largest dollar expenditure for any single
supply commodity within the DOD. In the past three-
year period, petroleum product purchases exceeded one
billion dollars each year. Transportation (tanker only)
amounted to approximately one hundred million dollars
per year and contracts for storage and services exceeded
twenty-four million dollars per year.
5
Some of the factors involved in the procurement
of petroleum are material specification, standardization,
inspection, cataloging, purchasing, priorities and
allocations, and off-shore procurement. Only the
latter three factors will be discussed below.
^Military Petroleum Supply Asrency, ojd. clt . . (n.d.)
..
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Priorities and Allocations - Although often
a source of irritation, a system of priorities and
allocations are of a vital necessity in the scheduling
of procurement and distribution of petroleum products.
In times of emergencies, only an intelligent application
of priorities and allocations can insure that the most
essential petroleum needs of the military, industry
and civilian economy, will receive the precedence in
procurement and distribution that they deserve. Reflect
for a moment that the importance of petroleum to our
National Defense effort is so vital that not a wheel in
Industry can turn without lubrication; the Nation 1 s
industrial capacity would be crippled without power;
the Nation's transportation system would grind to a
screeching halt; and our highly mobile and mechanized
military might would become tactically immovable.
Priorities and allocations present no particular
problem during peace time because of our industrial
capability and lesser total National demands. In
wartime, however, JCS formulates allocations and
priorities for the military and the unified commanders
exercise directive authority within their areas
through the Joint Petroleum Offices structure.
Funding and Pricing - Bulk and packaged
Navy procurements are initially funded by means of the
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Navy Stock Fund (NSF). The Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts administers the Stock Fund for products
purchased under its inventory control. The typical
funding cycle for a revolving fund prevails, i.e.,
the NSF finances procurement of items identified as
Navy Stock Account material and then the Navy Stock
Fund is reimbursed when final charge is made to the
appropriation for end use expenditure. The major
expenditure for petroleum, of course, is represented
by bulk products. Inventories are minimal and can
be measured in days of supply since bulk petroleum
enjoys a stock turn in excess of sixteen times per
annum.
°
Just as the Navy budgets for procurement of
petroleum, the other military departments likewise,
but independently, also perform this function.
Moreover, each Service establishes its own item
standard pricing criteria which criteria, unfortunately,
are not on a common basis.
Since the MPSA charter excluded the provision
of stock ownership, this automatically eliminated
any funding assignment consideration. MPSA does,
however, have coordination control for uniform pricing
%avy Fuel Supply Office Instruction 73201,
Accounting Instructions for Navy Owned Bulk Fuels
and Lubricant , file 20 dated 27 May 1959.
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amorist the Services. This control has not been
effective as found by the Lcp-istics Systems Study
Project committee which reported "Unnecessary
differences between the Services in pricing and
funding resulted in unnecessary difficulties in
management ."?
Buy American Act - For some time, military
petroleum ourchases have been exempt from the pro-
visions of the Buy American Act because of the
relative need in our domestic market for imported
petroleum. Even with what appears to be vast, known
U. S. proven reserves (I96l) totalling some
31,758,505,000 barrels, our U. S. Production rate
for the same year equalled a fantastic 2,512,273,000
pbarrels. This is less than 13 years proven reserves
based on this production rate. Recall that the
proven reserves in 1916 reported by the Secretary
of Interior was approximately 25 years. It would
appear that the worsening United States oil reserve
picture would serve to demand continuance of the
"Buy American" exemption.
7United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Operations. Military Supply
Management, Eighth Report by the Committee, Union
Calender N. 277 H.R. 674, July 15, 1959- (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 31.
pC
"U.S. Reserves Gain Modestly," The Oil and Gas
Journal . March 26, 1962.
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Because of industry pressure, petroleum was
removed from the exemption to the Buy American Act
as of 26 April 1952. MPSA reported that from that
date t o 31 December 1958 the added costs from domestic
procurement approximated $2.1 million. Although
these savings from off shore procurement are signifi-
cant, more vital is the requirement that the United
States foster and develop the off shore Free World
oil resources (known in I960 to be 69^ of the total
Free World's proven reserves).
The need for foreign oil becomes apparent when
one considers that during World War II the maximum
share of the nations petroleum consumption used by
the military was about 21$ (austere civilian ration-
ing was in effect). In recent peacetime years it has
approximated 3$ while during the Korean operation,
military consumption rate rose to about 5$ of the
national total.
When the requirements of petroleum for the
next ma^or war as expressed by Captain Boyd, (see
page v) are compared with United States production
o
Military Petroleum Supply Agency, Eighth




Washington, D. C, p. 3.
Naval War College Review, pjD. clt . . p. 15
-
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and reserves it would be disastrous to conclude
from this data that a war could be fought to victory
by our nation on a meager 20-25$ of our total produc-
tion.
And what about our Naval Petroleum Reserves -
although the Navy first began acquiring petroleum
reserves approximately 50 years ago its present
reserve holdings are inadequate to sustain a war
effort. Maximum efficient productive capacity of
the Naval Petroleum reserves does not exceed 220,000
barrels per day.-^
It appears then that the best interests of the
Nation would be served by reinstating the exemption
from the Buy American act in order to encourage Free
World development of off shore sources wheresoever
they may be to the point that petroleum products
migH be available at any given time of need.
Distribution
A military distribution system is defined as
"that complex of facilities, installations, methods,
AJ,This figure, representing the total daily
productive capability of the Naval Petroleum Reserves
located at Elk Hills, Buena Vista Hills, Teapot Dome,
and Point Barrow, is derived from information and
data obtained from the Hearings on H. R. 2948 et al
(1953), and Hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 13




and procedures, designed to receive, store, maintain,
distribute, and control the flow of military material
between the point of receipt into military system and
the point of issue of using activities and units. M ^2
Each Military Service has its own petroleum logistic
distribution system overseas (modified) as well as
within the United States. In continental United States
the function of requirements consolidation and review,
and control of distribution are separately administered
by the three Service inventory control points. It
wasn't until 1 March I960 that MPSA was given full
authority and responsibility to select sources of
product and means of transportation to meet resupply
requirement involving tanker and tanker/barge
combination movements to bulk terminals worldwide .-^
So it remains that control of the petroleum logistics
system within continental United States is still
divided three ways for packaged products and for bulk
moved by means other than water while at the same time
the system is coordinated under unified command overseas
12
Armed Forces Supply Suoport Center. Recommenda-
tion to Establish and Expand Commodity Single Management
Assignments . Department of Defense, Washington,
February, 1961, p. 176.
13
Military Petroleum Supply Agency, Memorandum




Overseas - At this point, however, a
distinction must be made about the integrated system
under unified command overseas for packaged products.
In essence, two separate supply requisitioning pro-
cedures and two separate distribution channels are
in effect for packaged products. As an example,
within the GINCLANT Command the selected group of
items appearing in the Federal Catalog C4-1 class -
as shown on Chart 6, page 37, are obtained through
the Unified Command, JPO replenishment channels
while the remainder of packaged items are obtained
by the requiring Service outside the Petroleum
logistic system by the normal supply channels for
14
other commodities. These special treatment items
are not exclusive with CINCLANT JPC since the list
is promulgated by MPSA to all JPO's. 15 It is felt
that special treatment for these many items contributes
to conflicts and confusion under emergency conditions.
14
Commander In Chief, United States Atlantic
Command, Atlantic Command Petroleum Reporting and
Slating Instructions . Serial 414/45, Norfolk, Virginia,
20 December I960.
15 ttMilitary Petroleum Supply Agency, Operating
Procedures ." Department of the Army AR 700-9100-5,
Department of the Navy NAVMPSA P-l, Department of the
Air Force AFR 67-142, Marine Corps NAVMC 1152 (Rev.)




List of Index Numbers of Petroleum packaged items in FSC Group 91 appearing in
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If in fact special treatment efforts are required
they should be directed toward strengthening the
existing supply supoort channels rather than devising
a separate, incompatible system. How better can the
integrity and responsiveness of the logistic channel
by improved?
It is demonstrated that the lead time for
Packaged Shipment Requests (Requisitions) through
the JPO*SAPO system stipulates delivery requirement
for the 5th month subsequent to the date of sub-
mission of the request^-" whereas the normal lead time,
or shipping and order time, for other packaged
petroleum products through normal supply channels
is 60 days or less. ~ It is axiomatic that decreased
lead time improves inventory control and lessens the
1 ft
absolute safety level requirement for stock. c Other
l6
Ibid, p. 3-5 (Ch. 3).
17
'Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Manual,
Vol. II, par. 22246.
18
Notes when not considering incremental
deliveries, a 3-month increase in the lenerth of the
replenishment period will have two effects on the
stock level necessary for a specified amount of pro-
tection. First, the stock level must be increased by
the amount of the mean expected demand for the 3-month
period, and second, the safety allowance is increased
by the factor - square root of the lead time.
•
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disadvantages that arise from the separate requisition-
ing channels is that overseas activities are precluded
from using the Rapid Data Requisitioning Transmission
Procedures since this system is not currently com-
patible with the Petroleum logistic system; parallel
requisitioning procedures are required for the same
commodity group; increased administrative burden on
MPSA and the Bureau for a p-reater number of deliveries
under contract to administer; and the additional
transportation costs involved in less than car lot
delivery to the pre positioned tide water transhipping
activity. This activity would normally be a Navy
Distribution Point supporting other fleet units,
activities, etc. with the same items.
Continental United States - Since the MPSA
is not a full blown single Manager, the services
maintain their own distribution system within the
continental United States. Considerable differences
on these systems exist in many aspects and a review
of the philosphy of the current systems is considered
appropriate.
Navy - The Navy positions stocks at
activities that have sufficient demand. Major stock-
ing points are replenished automatically based on
stock status reports submitted to FSO. Satellite
-
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activities submit requisition on major stock points.
Notable in the Navy system are its tidewater depots
located to furnish maximum support to the fleet and
overseas activities.
Army - This Army system is an area
distribution plan in which a depot furnishes support
to all customers in a geographical area. Certain
depots are designated to furnish support to overseas
activities. Requisitions are submitted to designated
requisitioning processing points. The Army Inventory
Control Point process and direct material to depots
and maintains inventory control over the stocks.
Air Force - A single distribution point
concept is used for all activities in the world. This
point also acts as the inventory manager. Requisitions
are submitted on the control depot, but stock
positioning varies from a sinsrle to several points.
From the above it can be concluded that little
integration of supply functions actually exists within
the United States and that the present authority of
MPSA serves not to eliminate duplication and over-
lapping. This fact is graphically presented on
Chart 7, page 41, by showinc the major areas of
duplication within the United States. Decreasing the
number of stocking points and by filling the needs of





area from the same depot and realignment of the
distribution pattern will result in a reduction of
long hauls, and the elimination or reduction of
cross hauls and back hauls.
Gross Servicing - So significant is the unifica-
tion or integration of the bulk products distribution
system overseas that it merits comment. The products
each Military Department is responsible for cross
servicing worldwide have been allocated by mutual
agreement of the Departments concerned. The major
factor involved in determining these responsibilities
was which Service had predominant interest in each
product and also had the facilities to handle distri-
bution.
Under this plan, in each overseas area, each
product is assigned to a single Service as its re-
sponsibility for submitting requirements for purchase
to MPSA and for funding the stocks for movement into
the theater. The Department owning the terminal
facility at which the product is stored retains owner-
ship of such facilities and continues to operate the
facilities for all three Services; maintenance and
operating cost of facilities is borne by the owning
Service, regardless of product ownership; replacement
of product losses is made by the owning Service; and
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the Service having inter-departmental supply responsi-
bility is responsible for the determination of standard
prices for products transferred to other Services.
This standard price is based on the current market
price plus surcharges to compensate for all foreseeable
losses and first destination transportation. The
Services have not agreed on a common basis for
standard pricing surcharges.
Graphic representation of the extent of cross-
servicing or inter-service supply support for bulk
and packaged petroleum products is shown on Charts 8
and 9, pages 44 and 45.
Here we observe the marriage of two supposedly
incompatible ideas - competition and cooperation - with
all three Services working together and participating
in providing coordinated logistic support with un-
common ownership of stocks to serve each others needs.
Storage - The acquisition of storage facilities
and the accumulation of stocks in advance of demands
are of primary importance in maintaining balanced
operations and minimizing peak loads on transportation.
Adequate, dispersed storage is essential to insure
maximum efficiency of bulk petroleum distribution,
maximum availability, and minimum loss of stocks in
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AUutiant AF AF AF N A N N
Mainland AF AF A AF N A A N
CINCARIB
Panama AF AF A AF N A N N
CINCLANT
AntllUt (1) AF AF A AF N A N N
Aiores AF AF AF N AF AF AF
Bahama* AF AF N AF AF AF
Bermuda AF AF AF N N N N
Cuba N N N N N N
Greenland AF AF AF AF N AF AF AF N
Iceland AF AF AF AF N AF AF N N






















Dhohren AF AF AF AF N AF
England AF AF AF AF N AF AF N
Italy (Except Leghorn) AF AF A AF N A A N N
LegKern AF AF A AF N A A A
North Africa
(Except Morroco) AF AF AF AF N AF AF N N
Turkey AF AF AF AF N AF AF AF N
CINCUSAFE .
Marroca AF AF AF AF N AF AF N N
Spain AF AF AF AF N AF AF N N
CINCUSAREUR
Benelux AF AF A AF N A A A N
France AF AF A AF N A A A N
Germany AF AF A AF N A A A N
CINCPAC
Howaii (2) AF AF AF AF N N N N N N N
Japan AF AF A AF N A A A N
Korea AF AF A AF N A A A N
Mariana* AF AF AF AF N N N N N
Philippines AF AF AF AF N N N N N
Ryuku* AF AF A AF N A A A N
Taiwan AF AF A AF N A A A N
NOTE: Doe. not include Aid Pro,™**. (l> EXCEPT VIE0UES
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OTHERS loot 1010 10SS •1100
UCTS
CINCAL
Aleutians N N N N N N AF N N N N
Mainland (1) A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
CINCARIB
Panama (2) A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Rodman, C.Z. N N N N N N AF N N N N
CINCLANT
Antilles (3) N N N N N N AF N N N N
Argentia N N N N N N AF N N N N
Azores AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Bahamas AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Bermuda N N N N N N AF N N N N
Fort Buchanan, P.R. N AF N AF N N AF AF N AF N
Greenland AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Iceland AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Labrador AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Newfoundland (4) AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF. AF
Ramey AFB,P.R. AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
CINCEUR
CINCUSAREUR
Benelux A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
France A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Germany A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
CINCNELM
Bahrein N N N N N N N N N N N
Dhahran AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
England AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Italy (5) N N N N N N AF N N N N
Leghorn A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Malta N N N N N N N N N N N
North Africa (6) AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Turkey (7) AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
CINCUSAFE
Port Lyautey N N N N N N N N N N N
Morocco (8) AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
Spain AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF AF
CINCPAC
Hawaii N N N N N N AF N N N N
Japan A A A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Korea A A A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Marianas N N N N N N AF N N N N
Philippines N N N N N N AF N N N N
Ryukyus A AF A AF A A AF AF A AF A
Taiwan (7) N N N N N N N N N N N
(1) Includes Shemya
(2) Excludes Rodman.C.Z.
(3) Excludes Fort Buchanan, P.R. & Ramey AFB. P.R
(4) Except Argentia
(5) Except Leghorn
(6) Except Morocco & Port Lyautey
(7) U.S. Forces excluding UA AG ,CAUG,/CA & UDAP
(8) Except Port Lyautey




MPSA coordinates the storage positioning of mobil-
ization reserve and peacetime operating stocks in
accordance with DOD policies, operational needs, and
with further considerations of the wartime missions
of the Military Services.
In overseas areas, petroleum storage may be
either military owned and operated or contracted
for commercially. MPSA contracts on a worldwide
basis for all commercial storage.
Planning for petroleum storage is undertaken
within JGS to support the JGS Strategic and Losristic
Plans. Such plans are general and detailed implementa-
tion takes place at military department level and
below. Cbviously, shifts in defense strategy call
for corresponding shifts in strategic requirements
and deliveries. Military departments in turn
compute storage requirements for current consumption
in accordance with policies established by Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).
MPSA reviews each military department's requirements
for operating and reserve storage making appropriate
recommendations thereon to the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (I&L).
Storage facilities which may be contracted for
by MPSA are the operational responsibility of the
-
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requesting department. Where Service competition
exists for available commercial storage MPSA under-
takes to arbitrate the matter and then allocates
storage in the manner that best meets the total
military needs.
Redistribution and Disposal of Excesses -
Redistribution of petroleum products occurs whenever
action is initiated by an Inventory Control Point to
transport material from the initial first destination
delivery point to lower echelon stocking points or
consumption activities. Redistribution may occur as
the result of excesses or through normal supply
support channels and obviously should be undertaken
only when the advantages are considered with respect
to the urgency of need and the other criteria of
expense involved in relocating excesses. Again,
since MPSA does not have wholesale stock ownership,
redistribution is the responsibility of the individual
Service Inventory Control Points. MPSA enters into
redistribution of Service assets only upon the request
of the Services when they report releaseable, excess
assets; overseas, only on agreement of the area
commander and only after coordination with the
interested military departments. As indicated else-
where in this paper, MPSA does not have authority to
-
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review Service requirements, receives no inventory
control stock status reports and therefore is in no
position to determine excess Service stocks unless
such stocks are reported by the Services involved.
The situation may well arise then where one Service
under its own authority may be redistributing!: from
one distribution area to another, while a second
Service may be purchasing to fill needs in that area





Nearly a half century has elapsed since the
Navy was initially beset with the problem of
assured fuel oil supply and its related distribu-
tion. The problem existed then and it exists today -
expressed in modern day parlance this involves the
need for a militarily responsive petroleum logistic
system bounded by the parameters of resource con-
straints, international political involvements, the
impact of the tremendous increase in military re-
quirements for petroleum on the national productive
capability and the need for economy in arriving at
the solution to the equations of this matrix.
The basic feasible solution evolves around the
paramount consideration of a dependable, responsive
and an economical petroleum logistic system. That
the existing system is dependable and responsive
has no quarrel. MPSA's successful performance
during the world apart, conflagrations of the Lebanon
and Formosa crises in 195^; the more recent crises
in VietNam; and the Congo, in meeting the instantan-
eous increased demands for petroleum creditably
'
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demonstrated this capability. Further evidence of
MPSA' s effectiveness is supported "by the statements
of the DOD Review Panel, Commodity Single Manager
Evaluation Study, which indicated, "Supply effective-
ness to Military departments approached 100^;
customer satisfaction high; and that all departments
have commented favorably on the MPSA' s procurement
effectiveness."^ This study was undertaken by the
DOD, involving the Joint Staff of JGS to arrive at
definitive conclusions concerning the efficacy of
the Single Manager Plan for petroleum, in peace and
war, on the basis of sustained performance.
Admittedly, the current procurement organization
has not undergone the true test of readiness required
of a ma lor war effort.
The final criterion which must be satisfied is
the one of economy. Dependability and responsive-
ness, unquestionably over-ride considerations of
economy during war time; however, no nation, either
in peace or war, can totally disregard the basic
theories of economics - the allocation of scarce
resources. The less resources required for support
Hearings, 86th Concress, ojd. clt . , pp. 107-11.
1
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of a military operation in terms of logistics the
more resources "become available for research and
development pursuit; for procurement of military
hardware - the means with which to defend; and for
allocation to civilian consumption. The need for
economy of operations cannot he disputed. It is
illustrated as the expressed purpose and objectives
of several DCD organizations cited in previous
chapters starting with SECBEF and extends to the
consumer. How well does our petroleum logistic
system fare in this regard?
It is not difficult to unveil numerous short-
comings in military petroleum supply operations.
These have been enumerated as over stocking,
duplication of stock at one or more sources, pro-
curement of items already in long supply, duplica-
tion of facilities; procurement of items held by
another Service as excess, cross hauling, and back
hauling - to name a few.
It is less difficult to realize that these
deficiencies surely arise because of the independent
inventory control, wholesale stock ownership, and
direct control over distribution system responsi-
bilities retained by the individual Services.
(Recall that these were excluded from the original
proposed Single Manager Plan for petroleum.)
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The significant economies achieved by other
Si riffle Managers that are fully integrated had been
derived from the elimination of concurrent buying
and selling, reduction of cross hauls and back hauls
through more integrated distribution, payroll reduc-
tions, better procurement operations and stimulation
2
of down turn in inventory levels. Why not the Single
Manager for Petroleum also?
Yes'. Why not petroleum also? The Services
maintain that petroleum is considered as too vital
a commodity to be placed more fully under single
management, and that the military commander must
control his own logistics to insure responsiveness
in accomplishing his mission. Do these arguments
"hold water" in light of (l) the effective, extensive
cross servicing being accomplished overseas, and
(2) under wartime conditions the very control the
military commander has over his logistics and
resources is reverted to sensible priorities and
allocations control under JCS. The Service argument-
ative points appear not well founded.
2





The very strength, support, and control which
the Single Manager for Petroleum requires to achieve
a more economical operation has been sapped by the
Services. MPSA has demonstrated its dependability
and responsiveness now it needs additional tools to
enable it to do its v1ob most efficiently. These
tools, as additional responsibilities, includes
1. ownership of wholesale stocks.
2. direct control over the petroleum
distribution system.
3. complete inventory control responsi-
bility for all products to include
computation of net requirements,
funding and pricing.
Directive control in these areas in lieu of the
present ineffective coordination responsibilities
would provide:
1. automatic coordination as against
voluntary cooperation of the Services.
2. immediate policy directives as against
channeled agreements with respective
agencies.
3* direct maintenance and availability of





The potential for a fully integrated agency has
never been greater than at this point in the evolution
of the petroleum logistics system. The technological
"break-through of digital computers and the automatic
data processing systems with inter-related high speed
tranciever systems provide not only the means for
centralized large scale operations but also serves
as additional justification for the implementation
of the integrated, centralized operation.
In order to successfully conclude this integra-
tion the following recommendations are submitted:
1- Assignment of whole stock ownership to
the agency . This would include wholesale
stocks of both bulk and packaged products
within the continental United States,
tanker cargoes and wholesale stocks of
bulk products at terminal facilities
overseas. Bulk stocks at station level
should be owned by Services and charged
to end use expenditure where very high
turnover rates exist. Services should,
however, retain this final determination
but such selection should preclude stock
funding of station stocks.
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2. Assignment of funding and pricing policies
to the agency . Services would budget only
for retail funding of minimal packaged
products and also for end use appropriation.
3. Assignment of responsibilities for determina-
tion of wholesale distribution points within
continental United States to the agency .
This includes assignment of distribution
pattern to the Services .
4. Assignment of inventory control responsi-
bilities to the agency. Including net
requirements determination . Military
Departments would compute program require-
ments and mobilization reserves based on
JCS Strategic and Logistic Plans for
inclusion in net requirements by the agency.
5. Assignment of responsibility for strategically
positioning mobilization reserve stocks
based on JGS location determination to
the agency .
6. The agency should prepare and submit to
the Joint Staff, JCS, regular periodic
stock reports for monitoring and evaluating




7. Modify the overseas distribution system
for packaged products to the normal supply
channels for regular commodity support ?
Remove JPC out of the packaged petroleum
logistic system except to receive regular
periodic inventory reports from SAPOs for
monitoring purposes. JPO retain staff
responsibilities for packaged products.
8. Military departments continue to own and
operate bulk terminals, within continental
United States and overseas - and to have
responsibility for stock losses except
those incurred because of normal tank
cleaning .
9. That POD pursue efforts to get petroleum
excluded from the provisions of the Buy
American Act .
Future of the Petroleum Logistic System
The future of the Petroleum logistic System now
appears to be in the hands of the Defense Supply Agency
(DSA). This agency evolved directly from SECDEF'
s
famous "Project 100" and was adopted from three alterna-
tive plans presented as long term blueprints for organ-




In a nutshell, Plan 1 proposed continuing the
Single Manager Operating Agency method - hut with
improvements: Plan II suggested a single consolidated
agency vested in one of the military departments;
Plan III, the one adopted, called for a single agency
outside the military departments that would report
directly to SECDEF.
With the establishment of BSA another milestone
has been created in the petroleum logistic system as
the Military Petroleum Supply Agency has been redesig-
nated the Defense Petroleum Supply Center (DPSC)
effective 1 January 1962. To date, the revised DPSC
charter has not been promulgated. As with MPSA, BPSG
does not now have any supply management, stock control
or financial management functions whatsoever. It is
understood that the major change in the process of
being incorporated in the DPSC charter is the assign-
ment of packaged petroleum products management to DPSC.
This is a step forward; however, integration cannot be
considered complete until such time as the responsi-
bilities enumerated above, along with commensurate
authority to accomplish them, have been assigned to DPSC.
4
Defense Supply Agency, " General Order No. 2 ."
dated 20 December 1961
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In ray opinion, no agency which has major logistical
responsibilities can function most effectively without
positive provision for directive control. Only when
such action is final will our militarily responsive
and dependable petroleum logistic system be in a
position to most economically do its Job of providing
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